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1543 
“CONCERT” OR SOLO GIG? WHERE THE NLRB 
WENT WRONG WHEN IT LINKED IN TO  
SOCIAL NETWORKS 
Late last year, labor law took an important step into the 21st century. In 
Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc.,
1
 the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB or ―Board‖) held that an employer violated section 8 of the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or ―Act‖) by terminating five 
employees who posted a series of comments about the employer on the 
popular social networking website Facebook.
2
 Outside of work hours, the 
employees posted to Facebook a number of comments about a dispute 
related to their job. The original post said, ―Lydia Cruz, a coworker feels 
that we don‘t help our clients enough at HUB I about had it! My fellow 
coworkers how do u feel?‖3 In less than two hours, a number of her 
colleagues posted a variety of responses, including: ―What the f. . . Try 
doing my job I have 5 programs‖; ―What the Hell, we don‘t have a life as 
is, What else can we do???‖; and ―Tell her to come do mt [my] fucking job 
n c if I don‘t do enough, this is just dum.‖4 
The employee who was the subject of the posts saw them on Facebook 
and complained to a supervisor at work.
5
 The supervisor met individually 
with five of the employees who posted messages, told them that the posts 
―constituted bullying and harassment and violated [the employer‘s] policy 
on harassment,‖ and discharged them immediately.6 An Administrative 
Law Judge held in September 2011 that the employer wrongfully 
 
 
 1. 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 (2012). 
 2. Id. at 1. Facebook is a social networking website that allows users to publish information on 
the Internet in a way that will make it viewable to all Internet-users or only to ―friends‖ that the poster 
designates. The NLRB General Counsel released a memorandum on the social media cases in which 
he defined social media as ―various online technology tools that enable people to communicate easily 
via the internet to share information and resources. These tools can encompass text, audio, video, 
images, podcasts, and other multimedia communications.‖ Memorandum OM 12-31 Rep. of the 
Acting Gen. Counsel Concerning Social Media Cases to All Reg‘l Directors, Officers-in-Charge, and 
Resident Officers 2 (Jan. 24, 2012), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031 
d45807d6567 [hereinafter General Counsel‘s Second Memo]. See also Danah M. Boyd & Nicole B. 
Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and Scholarship, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED 
COMM. 210, 211 (2008) (defining ―social networks‖ as ―web-based services that allow individuals to: 
(1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users 
with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made 
by others within the system‖). 
 3. Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, at 7. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 8. 
 6. Id. 
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terminated the employees in violation of sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA,
7
 
and the Board upheld the decision.
8
  
Social networks have been a prevalent part of the Internet for years,
9
 
but in 2012 the Board first took the position that employees can be 
protected under sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA from retaliation for their 
online activity.
10
 Section 7 mandates that ―[e]mployees shall have the right 
. . . to engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.‖11 Section 8 makes it an 
unfair labor practice to ―interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the 
exercise of the rights guaranteed in [Section 7].‖12  
These cases arise out of similar fact patterns. An employee logs onto a 
social networking website, such as Facebook or Twitter, and publishes a 
brief comment about something that he finds unsatisfactory at work.
13
 
Some posts are disparaging and derogatory;
14
 others are less offensive. 
Because social networking websites are designed to allow users to interact 
and share information with one another, other web users (including co-
workers and customers) read the material.
15
 On Twitter, a user might 
―retweet‖ the comment to share it with more users and add her own 
opinion.
16
 To do the same on Facebook, a user might perform any number 
of actions which would disperse the material to more people on the site: 
 
 
 7. Id. at 9. 
 8. Id. at 1. 
 9. See, e.g., Eszter Hargittai & Yu-li Patrick Hsieh, From Dabblers to Omnivores: A Typology 
of Social Network Site Usage, in A NETWORKED SELF: IDENTITY, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE ON 
SOCIAL NETWORK SITES 146, 146 (Zizi Papacharissi ed., 2011) (―Social network sites (SNSs) have 
become some of the most popular online destinations in recent years . . . .‖). 
 10. See Memorandum OM 11-74 Rep. of the Acting Gen. Counsel Concerning Social Media 
Cases to All Reg‘l Directors, Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers (Aug. 18, 2011), available at 
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458056e743 [hereinafter General Counsel‘s First 
Memo] (summarizing case developments arising from the use of social media). 
 11. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 12. Id. § 158.  
 13. See infra text accompanying notes 70, 99–100, and 114. 
 14. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 4; see also Sam Hananel, Woman Fired Over 
Facebook Rant; Suit Follows, MSNBC.COM (Nov. 10, 2010, 9:43:18 AM), http://www.msnbc 
.msn.com/id/40097443/ns/business-careers/t/woman-fired-over-facebook-rant-suit-follows/ (employee 
posted message on personal Facebook page that said ―Love how the company allows a 17 to be a 
supervisor,‖ where ―17‖ is a term used to denote a psychiatric patient). 
 15. See infra note 187. For further reading on how social networks work and the scope of 
viewers who can see a user‘s post on a social network, see generally John M. Miller, Is MySpace 
Really My Space? Examining the Discoverability of the Contents of Social Media Accounts, 30 TRIAL 
ADVOC. Q. 28, 28–29 (2011). 
 16. See FAQs About Retweets (RT), TWITTER, http://support.twitter.com/articles/77606 (last 
visited Jan. 19, 2013) (―Twitter‘s retweet feature helps you and others quickly share that Tweet with 
all of your followers.‖). 
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clicking a button beneath the post that says ―Like;‖17 sharing the item with 
her own network of Facebook friends;
18
 or adding a comment beneath the 
original post.
19
 Co-workers or customers of the same employer might 
reply to the complaint to offer their support or disagreement.
20
 They might 
formulate a plan to improve the situation when they return to work,
21
 or 
they might not.
22
 In any case, almost as soon as the post goes online, the 
employer finds out about it and subsequently discharges the employee for 
insubordination.
23
  
The employee files a complaint with the Board under section 8(a) of 
the Act.
24
 When the case makes its way to court, the principal legal issue is 
whether the employee who was terminated for posting the material online 
was engaging in a protected concerted activity for the purpose of mutual 
aid or protection. The issue is of particular importance because of the 
potential volume of claims that could arise based on terminations that 
result from employee expression on the Internet.
25
 
Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) first answered these questions in a 
series of cases in 2011, and the NLRB followed by upholding two of those 
 
 
 17. Liking on Facebook, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/like (last visited Jan. 19, 
2013) (―Clicking Like under something you or a friend posts on Facebook is an easy way to let 
someone know that you enjoy it . . . .‖); see also infra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 18. See How to Post and Share, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/sharing (last visited 
Jan. 19, 2013). 
 19. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 115. When a Facebook user adds a comment to 
another user‘s post, the material becomes visible to larger network of users. See Thomas E. Weber, 
Cracking the Facebook Code, THE DAILY BEAST (Oct. 18 2010, 2:57 AM), http://www.thedaily 
beast.com/articles/2010/10/18/the-facebook-news-feed-how-it-works-the-10-biggest-secrets.html. 
 20. Boyd & Ellison, supra note 2, at 210 (―Most sites support the maintenance of pre-existing 
social networks, but others help strangers connect based on shared interests, political views, or 
activities.‖).  
 21. See infra text accompanying note 70. 
 22. See infra text accompanying notes 97–100. 
 23. See infra text accompanying notes 72, 104, 120, 123. 
 24. 28 U.S.C. § 158 (2012). 
 25. Numerous news articles describe employees who are fired when their supervisors discover 
their posts on Facebook. For example, in one recent incident, the Pittsburgh Pirates fired their team 
mascot because he expressed his disagreement with a management decision made by the team‘s 
president. Dan Majors, Out at the plate: Pirates dump outspoken pierogi, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE 
(Mar. 29, 2012, 2:15 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/sports/pirates/out-at-the-plate-pirates-
dump-outspoken-pierogi-251881/. In another interesting story, Internet users identified a Burger King 
employee who posted a picture of himself standing in containers of lettuce that was to be served to 
customers. Vince Grzegorek, 4Chan Catches Mayfield Heights Burger King Employee Who Snapped 
Pictures of Himself Standing on Food (July 19, 2012, 2:32 PM), http://www.clevescene.com/scene-
and-heard/archives/2012/07/17/4chan-catches-mayfield-heights-burger-king-employee-who-snapped-
pictures-of-himself-standing-on-food. These particular facts may not have made for strong wrongful 
termination complaints under section 7, but they illustrate the common occurrence of terminations 
because of online conduct.  
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decisions in 2012.
26
 Despite the NLRB General Counsel‘s assertions to the 
contrary, the initial lawsuits in this area have not targeted situations that 
are ―fairly straightforward‖27 under section 7. Rather, the nature of social 
networking websites and the comments that employees commonly publish 
on them raise compelling questions about the scope of protection afforded 
under the law, indicating that the NLRB in fact is ―wading into uncharted 
legal territory‖28 and should take an early opportunity to set the right 
course. The Internet is a new medium for employees acting in concert, but 
the core principles for determining what constitutes ―concerted activity‖ 
remain the same.
29
 Although the meaning of ―concerted activity‖ is broad 
enough to encompass some individual activity,
30
 there are limitations on 
how far the term will go to protect an employee who acts by making a 
Facebook post or Tweet.
31
 
 
 
 26. See Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 (2012); Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 
358 N.L.R.B. No. 164 (2012); Cameron G. Shilling, Social Media and the NLRB (Part 1): The NLRB 
Intervenes in Social Media, PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY BLOG (Oct. 3, 2011), http://blog.mc 
lane.com/?p=618 (noting the NLRB‘s foray into social media). Soon after the ALJs issued their first 
opinions, commentators realized that input from the NLRB, and perhaps someday the courts of 
appeals, would be forthcoming. See, e.g., Brian Wassom, 5 Predictions for Social Medial Law in 2012, 
MASHABLE (Jan. 5, 2012), http://mashable.com/2012/01/05/social-media-legal-predictions/. The D.C. 
Circuit recently called into question the validity of these decisions—and many others—when it ruled 
that the Board did not have a quorum in Canning v. NLRB, 2013 WL 276024, No. 12-1115 (D.C. Cir. 
Jan. 25, 2013). For a discussion of how the Canning decision may affect the social media cases, see 
Brian Wingfield, Workers Griping on Facebook at Risk of Job Loss After Ruling, WASH. POST, Jan. 
29, 2013, http://washpost.bloomberg.com/Story?docId=1376-MHCODP6TTDSH01-2T2IJ37086113K 
K1B9N2GFFJAL. 
 27. Steven Greenhouse, Company Accused of Firing Over Facebook Post, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/09/business/09facebook.html?_r=0. 
 28. Catherine Ho, Business Abuzz About Workplace Rules on Social Media, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 
2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/labor-board-ruling-has-businesses-buzz 
ing-about-workplace-rules-on-social-media/2011/09/26/gIQABVYmFL_story.html; see also Michael 
Lebowich, Rondald Meisburg, Mark Theodore and Corinne Osborn, NLRB “De-Friends” Employers 
In Its First Complaint Based On Employee’s Social Network Comments, METROPOLITAN CORPORATE 
COUNSEL (Dec. 1 2010), http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/articles/13284/nlrb-de-friends-employers-
its-first-complaint-based-employees-social-network-comments (arguing that comments on social 
networks are different than ―conversations around the water cooler‖ because only the former ―are 
broadcast to hundreds or thousands of persons with a few keystrokes and the click of a mouse‖). 
 29. ―The specific medium in which the discussion takes place is irrelevant to its protected 
nature.‖ Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille, No. 34-CA-12915, 2012 WL 76862 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges 
Jan. 3, 2012) (citing Timekeeping Systems, Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244, 247 (1997)); see also Hispanics 
United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, at 1 (―Although the employees‘ mode of communicating their workplace 
concerns might be novel, we agree with the judge that the appropriate analytical framework for 
resolving their discharge allegations has long been settled under Meyers Industries and its progeny.‖).  
 30. See infra notes 138–40 and accompanying text. 
 31. Cf., e.g., Tyler Bus. Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 680 F.2d 338 (4th Cir. 1982) (finding no concerted 
activity where employee told client about a rumor that the company‘s president and vice president 
were having an affair because there was no evidence that the employee wanted to induce group action 
or to act on behalf of other employees); Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 
1949) (finding that employee who was discharged for circulating a position which called for the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss5/7
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This Note argues that some of the recent social media decisions by 
ALJs and the Board may extend section 7‘s protection of concerted 
activity beyond what precedent allows.
32
 Furthermore, it proposes that 
even where the activity is concerted and for mutual aid or protection, the 
NLRB should not apply section 7 protection to employee social network 
posts that tarnish the employer‘s public image by disseminating details 
about workplace problems on the Internet. The Supreme Court has 
suggested that ―even when concerted activity comes within the scope of 
the ‗mutual aid or protection‘ clause, the forms such activity permissibly 
may take may well depend on the object of the activity.‖33 In the social 
networking cases, the Board and courts would best effectuate the purpose 
of the NLRA, while allowing employers to control their public image, by 
protecting only employees‘ online statements that are communicated 
privately or that do not disparage the employer. 
Part I provides a general history of the NLRA and an overview of 
recent social networking cases that have been decided by ALJs. Part II 
examines the definition of concerted activity and the challenges for parties 
who contend that their individual social network activity was concerted. 
Part III discusses the ―mutual aid or protection‖ requirement. Part IV 
suggests that in deciding whether to grant employees section 7 protection, 
the NLRB should adopt a balancing test that would consider the form of 
the protest against the object of the activity before extending protection.
34
 
 
 
removal of a certain foreman was acting out of personal resentment that constituted an individual 
gripe, not a concerted activity protected by section 7 of the NLRA). 
 32. The NLRB has ―broad authority to construe the NLRA in light of its expertise,‖ but ―judicial 
deference is not accorded a decision of the NLRB when the Board acts pursuant to an erroneous view 
of the law.‖ Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 
U.S. 80, 94 (1943) (―[I]f [agency] action is based upon a determination of law as to which the 
reviewing authority of the courts does come into play, an order may not stand if the agency has 
misconceived the law.‖); NLRB v. KSM Indus., 682 F.3d 537, 544 (7th Cir. 2012) (―We . . . defer to 
the Board‘s interpretations of the law ‗unless they are irrational or inconsistent with the Act.‘‖); Local 
Joint Exec. Bd. of Las Vegas v. NLRB, 657 F.3d 865, 870 (9th Cir. 2011) (―Under Chevron . . . , we 
defer to the Board‘s interpretation of the NLRA if its interpretation is rational and consistent with the 
Act.‖). 
 33. Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 568 n.18 (1978) (emphasis added). Of course, it is 
unlikely that an entire mode of communication could (or should) be excluded altogether. See MARION 
G. CRAIN, PAULINE T. KIM, & MICHAEL SELMI, WORK LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ch. 8, § D.3, 
Note 1.a (2d ed. Supp. 2012) (―As the Board explained in Timekeeping Systems, the NLRA‘s 
protection of concerted activity applies to e-mail as well as to more traditional forms of oral and 
written communication.‖).  
 34. Related issues not covered in this Note are the NLRB‘s recent challenges against the legality 
of employee handbook social media provisions that may violate the protection of concerted activity in 
section 7. Generally, the NLRB not only strikes down policies that explicitly restrict protected 
activities, but also provisions that ―(1) employees would reasonably construe to prohibit Section 7 
activity; (2) [were] promulgated in response to union activity; or (3) [were] applied to restrict the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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I. HISTORY OF THE NLRA, CONCERTED ACTIVITY, AND THE SOCIAL 
NETWORKING LAWSUITS 
Section 7 of the NLRA is the legal foundation for the NLRB‘s claims 
against employers in the social network cases.
35
 Under the law, 
―[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or to 
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives 
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the 
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.‖36 
Although the statute enumerates a few very specific rights, the catch-all 
protection of ―concerted activities for . . . mutual aid or protection‖ is 
much broader.
37
 Section 8 makes it unlawful for employers to retaliate 
against employees who engage in concerted activity under section 7.
38
 To 
meet the requirements for protection, the employee‘s activity: (1) must be 
concerted; (2) must be undertaken for the purpose of mutual aid or 
protection; and (3) cannot be unlawful, excessively disloyal, or any other 
circumstance that would go beyond the purpose of the statute and justify 
removing protection.
39
 Additionally, for the employer to be liable, the 
 
 
exercise of Section 7 rights.‖ Guardsmark, LLC v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 369, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). The General Counsel has only recently challenged social media 
policies unlawfully restricting activity protected by section 7. See Cameron G. Shilling, Social Media 
and the NLRB (Part 2): Employment Policies—The Chilling of Concerted Activity, PRIVACY AND 
DATA SECURITY BLOG (Oct. 5, 2011), http://blog.mclane.com/?p=645 (summarizing NLRB‘s approach 
to employers‘ social media rules).  
 35. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).  
 36. Id. (emphasis added).  
 37. See generally Charles J. Morris, NLRB Protection in the Nonunion Workplace: A Glimpse at 
a General Theory of Section 7 Conduct, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1673, 1678–1700 (1989) (showing how the 
statutory language, congressional intent, and rulings by the Board and the courts all support a broad 
reading of ―concerted activities‖). 
 38. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2012). Section 8 gives the statute its enforcement power, making it an 
unfair labor practice for an employer to ―interfere with, restrain, or coerce‖ employees who engage in 
the concerted activities described in section 7. Often, an employer who interferes with the right to 
engage in concerted activity does it by discharging the employee. See, e.g., Vic Tanny Int‘l, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 622 F.2d 237 (6th Cir. 1980) (employer committed unfair labor practice by discharging 
employees who engaged in protected activity). 
 39. This final element is not in the text of the statute, but is well established through case law. 
Courts will remove protection for a number of circumstances that may be applicable to posts made 
online, but they do not present particularly new challenges in that context and are generally outside the 
scope of this Note. See, e.g., Jolliff v. NLRB, 513 F.3d 600, 610 (6th Cir. 2008) (defamatory 
statements made with actual malice are not protected by section 7); Endicott Interconnect Techs., Inc. 
v. NLRB, 453 F.3d 532 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (employee‘s disloyalty warranted discharge); Star Meat Co. 
v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 13, 14 (6th Cir. 1980) (noting that some violent acts by employees ―remove such 
employees from the protection of the Act‖); NLRB v. Knuth Bros., Inc., 537 F.2d 950, 956 (7th Cir. 
1976) (finding disclosure of employers‘ confidential information to be cause for discharge). But see 
Reef Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 952 F.2d 830, 837 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that letter and t-shirt that 
employees sent to a personnel manager were not offensive enough to lose protection). The Supreme 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss5/7
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employer must have ―[known] the concerted nature of the employee‘s 
activity,‖ and that activity must have been the motivation for the 
employee‘s discharge.40 Unlike most other provisions of the NLRA, this 
section applies to nearly all non-union workplaces.
41
 
The general history of section 7 of the NLRA, like many other labor 
laws, is tied to the legacy of the New Deal. Also known as the Wagner 
Act, the law was passed at a time when ―employers were virtually 
unrestrained by law from dealing with unions as they saw fit.‖42 Prior to 
the passage of the NLRA, when employees tried to make a better 
workforce through union activity, employers engaged in ―bribery of 
employees, company spy systems, blacklisting of union sympathizers, 
removal of an existing business to another location for the sole purpose of 
frustrating union activity, and promises by employers of wage increases or 
other special concessions to employees should the latter refrain from 
joining a union.‖43 ―The Wagner Act was motivated by Senator Robert 
Wagner‘s desire to enable workers and employers to bargain from levels 
of comparative strength and to achieve industrial peace through collective 
bargaining.‖44  
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has applied section 7 to protect 
employees who distributed union-sponsored newsletters to co-workers,
45
 
and employees who left work without permission to protest cold 
temperatures in the workplace.
46
 However, the Court has also recognized 
 
 
Court recognized these limitations in NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 17 (1962) (listing 
types of employee activities that are not protected by the Act). Taking a narrower position than this 
Note, one commentator has argued that ―when an employee posts expletives about his employer on a 
social-networking website, it is not protected behavior under § 7 of the NLRA.‖ Kimberly Bielan, 
Note, All A-“Twitter”: The Buzz Surrounding Ranting on Social-Networking Sites and Its Ramification 
on the Employment Relationship, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 155, 158 (2011). 
 40. Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, at 2 (2012). 
 41. The NLRA applies broadly to all employers whose businesses affect interstate commerce, 
with the exception of a few specific occupations: agricultural laborers, domestic workers, employees 
of a parent or spouse, independent contractors, and ―individual[s] employed by an employer subject to 
the Railway Labor Act.‖ 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012). Additionally, the Act does not protect managers or 
―any individual employed as a supervisor.‖ See id. (exempting supervisors); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace 
Co. Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974) (finding that ―Congress intended to exclude from 
the protections of the Act all employees properly classified as ‗managerial‘‖). 
 42. ARTHUR A. SLOANE & FRED WITNEY, LABOR RELATIONS 105 (3d ed. 1977). Before the 
passage of the NLRA, ―[t]he employers‘ traditional weapons for fighting labor organizations—such as 
formal and informal espionage, blacklists, and the very potent practice of discharging ‗agitators‘—
were normally left undisturbed by the judges.‖ Id. 
 43. Id. at 108. 
 44. Donald C. Carroll, At-Will Employment: The Arc of Justice Bends Towards the Doctrine’s 
Rejection, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 655, 663 (2012). 
 45. Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978). 
 46. NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962). 
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certain limitations to the clause.
47
 Ultimately, in its more than seventy-five 
years of existence, section 7 has been used to protect employees and 
increase their bargaining power when they intend to create a better work 
environment. 
A. Section 7 before Social Media 
Before examining the application of section 7 to the new social media 
cases, it is informative to review two cases under section 7: a classic case 
arising under the law, and a modern one that applied section 7 to another 
modern technology: e-mails. 
NLRB v. Washington Aluminum is an early and oft-cited case involving 
non-union employees who exercise their rights under section 7.
48
 On an 
―extraordinarily cold day in Baltimore,‖ employees arrived to work at their 
employer‘s machine shop to find unbearably cold (and therefore 
unworkable) conditions.
49
 The employees discussed the issue among 
themselves, and decided to leave with the hope that it would persuade their 
employer to fix the heating issue.
50
  
After the employees were discharged for the walkout, they brought a 
claim under section 7.
51
 The employer argued that employees should not 
receive protection because they did not give the employer any opportunity 
to avoid the walkout by granting their demands.
52
 The Supreme Court 
disagreed, concluding that employees do not lose protection ―merely 
because they do not present a specific demand upon their employer to 
remedy a condition they find objectionable.‖53 Without any dissent, the 
Court recognized that the employees should receive protection under the 
NLRA.
54
 
 
 
 47. See, e.g., NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, Int‘l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 346 U.S. 464 (1953) 
(holding that an employer did not engage in an unfair labor practice by discharging employees who 
made a public disparaging attack on the employer and did not reference any ongoing labor 
controversy). 
 48. 370 U.S. 9 (1962). 
 49. Id. at 11. The temperature in the shop was 11 degrees, and the furnace responsible for heating 
the building had broken. Id. 
 50. Id. at 11–12. One employee described their goal very well in terms of the purpose behind 
section 7: ―‗And we had all got together and thought it would be a good idea to go home; maybe we 
could get some heat brought into the plant that way.‘‖ Id. at 12. 
 51. Id. at 13–14. 
 52. Id. at 13. 
 53. Id. at 14. 
 54. Id. at 18. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss5/7
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A more recent case illustrates how the NLRA applies to modern day 
technology. In Timekeeping Systems,
55
 the Board addressed section 7 as it 
relates to employee communication over email. The case involved an 
employee who sent an email to his co-workers and supervisor to explain 
why a proposed vacation time policy would be unfavorable to the 
workplace.
56
 Offended that the complaint went to the entire office, the 
supervisor asked the employee send an apology memo to the recipients of 
the message.
57
 When the employee declined, he was discharged.
58
 
The NLRB concluded that the employee was engaged in concerted 
activity for mutual aid or protection.
59
 The employee‘s activity was 
protected because it was an ―effort to incite the other employees to help 
him preserve a vacation policy which he believed best served his interests, 
and perhaps the interess of other employees . . . .‖60 Finally, even though 
the employee‘s email contained some arrogant language, it was not 
egregious enough to lose protection.
61
 Despite his online activity over the 
company email system, the court ordered reinstatement.
62
 
After Timekeeping Systems, section 7 and new communications 
technologies did not meet in case law. In the meantime, commentators 
discussed employee blogging as the next area of NLRA application.
63
 
Over a decade after Timekeeping Systems, the social media cases emerged. 
B. The Social Network Cases 
A summary of three section 7 social networking cases illustrates the 
interaction between employers and employees on social networks and the 
new problem before the courts. In August 2011, NLRB General Counsel 
Lafe E. Solomon released a report to ―present[] recent case developments 
 
 
 55. 323 N.L.R.B. 244 (1997). 
 56. Id. at 246. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 247. 
 59. Id. at 248. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 249. 
 62. Id. at 250. This most colorful portion of the opinion prophesized problems that might occur 
in the future from employee Internet activity: ―[the employee] is, I concede, a rather unusual person, 
perhaps one of a new breed of cyberspace pineers who are attracting public attention, and at the same 
time—how else can I say it—a bit of a wise guy.‖ Id. 
 63. See, e.g., Marc Cote, Getting Dooced: Employee Blogs and Employer Blogging Policies 
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 82 WASH. L. REV. 121 (2007); Katerine M. Scott, When Is 
Employee Blogging Protected By Section 7 of the NLRA?, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 17; Robert 
Sprague, Fired for Blogging: Are there Legal Protections for Employees Who Blog?, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. 
& EMP. L. 355 (2007). 
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arising in the context of today‘s social media.‖64 Without identifying any 
cases specifically by name, the report described a variety of complaints 
that the General Counsel has filed. This Note will focus on three 
illustrative ones: Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc.,
65
 Karl Knauz Motors,
66
 
and Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille.
67
 
1. Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc. 
The first case to address employees terminated for social media activity 
was Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., decided by an ALJ on September 2, 
2011, and affirmed with a separate opinion by the NLRB on December 14, 
2012.
68
 The problems that led to the litigation began when one employee 
published a comment during non-work hours on Facebook about a co-
worker who had been critical of her work and may have been preparing to 
take her complaints to a supervisor.
69
 The post briefly explained the 
problem and then asked, ―My fellow coworkers how do u feel?‖70 Four co-
workers responded with a number of comments, such as: ―What the f . . . 
Try doing my job I have 5 programs‖; ―Tell her to come do . . . [my] 
fucking job n c if I don‘t do enough, this is just dum‖; and ―(insert sarcasm 
here now).‖71 The employee who was the subject of the posts brought 
them to the attention of a supervisor, who fired five of the employees who 
had participated in the online conversation.
72
 The General Counsel 
initiated a complaint on behalf of all of the discharged employees.
73
 
 
 
 64. General Counsel‘s First Memo, supra note 10, at 2. Although the purpose of the report was to 
educate employers and ―encourage compliance‖ with section 7, id., it ―clearly stakes a claim for the 
NLRB‖ with regard to its position about concerted activity through social media. Shilling, supra note 
34. 
 65. 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37 (2012). 
 66. 358 N.L.R.B. 164 (2012). 
 67. 2012 WL 76862 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Jan. 3, 2012). 
 68. Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37. 
 69. Id. at 7. In each of the cases covered by this Note, the post was made outside of work hours 
using a non-work computer. Under the rule from Atlantic Steel, an employee may lose section 7 
protection based on ―the place of the discussion.‖ Atlantic Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979). 
Consequently, social media posts could lose protection if the employee makes them ―on the clock,‖ a 
scenario not covered by this Note. See Atlantic Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979) (describing 
the ―place of the discussion‖ as relevant to protection). 
 70. Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, at 2, 7. 
 71. Id. at 7–8. When the NLRB upheld the ALJ‘s decision, its opinion did not repeat all of the 
comments that the employees posted. Id. at 2. 
 72. Id. at 2. It was not disputed that the reason for the termination was the Facebook posts. In 
cases where the employer contends that the motive for discharge was something other than protected 
activity, courts assess the credibility of the reason under the burden-shifting framework set forth in 
NLRB v. Wright Line, Inc., 662 F.2d 899, 904–07 (1st Cir. 1981). 
 73. Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, at 6. 
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The ALJ held that the employer committed an unfair labor practice by 
terminating the five employees who wrote the posts.
74
 The ALJ cited 
Meyers I and Meyers II, which held that concerted activities are those 
―engaged in with or on the authority of other employees, and not solely by 
and on behalf of the employee himself.‖75 In Meyers II, the Board 
expanded the definition of ―concerted activities‖ to include ―circumstances 
where individual employees seek to initiate or to induce or to prepare for 
group action, as well as individual employees bringing truly group 
complaints to the attention of management.‖76 The ALJ suggested that ―[i]t 
is irrelevant to this case that the disciminatees were not trying to change 
their working conditions and that they did not communicate their concerns 
to [the employer],‖77 but the holding was on narrower grounds. 
Reemphasizing that ―[i]ndividual action is concerted so long as it is 
engaged in with the object of initiating or inducing group action,‖78 the 
ALJ held that the employees were engaging in concerted activity by 
―taking a first step towards taking group action to defend themselves 
against accusations that they could reasonably believe [a co-worker] was 
going to make to management.‖79 The ALJ also determined that the 
employees‘ Facebook posts were not ―so opprobrious as to lose protection 
under the Act.‖80 Finally, the ALJ held that the discharged employees had 
not been harassing another employee through their Facebook posts, so the 
employer could not justify their termination on that basis.
81
  
The NLRB affirmed the ALJ‘s rulings, findings, and conclusions, but 
added its own opinion.
82
 Also relying on the rules from the Meyers cases, 
the Board found that the activity was concerted because the original author 
of the post was ―solicit[ing] her coworkers‘ views about [another 
 
 
 74. Id. at 9. 
 75. Id. at 8 (quoting Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers I), 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 76. Id. at 2 (quoting Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 887 (1986)). 
 77. Id. at 9. 
 78. Id. (citing Mushroom Transp. Co., 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964); Whittaker Corp., 289 
N.L.R.B. 933 (1988)). In Mushroom Transportation, the court held that an employee did not engage in 
activity protected by section 7 when he talked to other employees about how to deal with problems at 
work because there was ―no evidence that any question of group action ever entered into the 
conversations.‖ 330 F.2d at 685. 
 79. Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, at 9. 
 80. Id. In making this determination, the ALJ looked to the four factors: ―(1) the place of the 
discussion; (2) the subject matter of the discussion; (3) the nature of the employee‘s outburst; and (4) 
whether the outburst was, in any way, provoked by an employer‘s unfair labor practice.‖ Id. at 9–10. 
These factors are from Atlantic Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814 (1979). 
 81. Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, at 10. 
 82. Id. at 1. 
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employee‘s] criticism.‖83 As for the other four employees, ―[b]y 
responding . . . with comments of protest, [they] made common cause with 
her, and, together, their actions were concerted.‖84 Furthermore, the Board 
reaffirmed the ALJ‘s finding that the actions were concerted because they 
were a ―first step towards taking group action to defend themselves against 
the accusations they thought could reasonably believe [a co-worker] was 
going to make to management.‖85  
The Board majority opinion and its lone dissenter disagreed as to 
whether the five employees satisfied the ―mutual aid or protection‖ 
element.
86
 The dissent reasoned that the employees were merely 
―venting‖87 to each other to express their ―mutual disagreement with [their 
co-worker‘s] criticism of their job performance.‖88 That the conversation 
involved opinions about job performance did not make it ―for mutual aid 
or protection,‖ particularly because the employees did not ―suggest or 
implicitly contemplate doing anything in response to this criticism.‖89 The 
dissent went on to note that there was no evidence that the employees were 
talking to each other ―with the intent of promoting a group defense,‖ and 
reasoned that the case would be different if the original post had informed 
the colleagues of an intent to discuss the issue with management.
90
  
In response, the majority noted that the ―object or goal of initiating, 
inducing, or preparing for group action does not have to be stated 
explicitly when employees communicate,‖ for the discussion to receive 
protection.
91
 In this case, the majority held that the employees satisfied the 
―mutual aid‖ element because the objective of preparing for group action 
was manifest through the discussion, even if it was not expressly stated.
92
  
2. Karl Knauz Motors 
Less than one month after the ALJ in Hispanics United issued a ruling, 
another ALJ issued a decision on social networks and section 7, which was 
also reviewed and affirmed by the Board. In Karl Knauz Motors, the ALJ 
and Board found that some of an employee‘s activities were concerted, 
 
 
 83. Id. at 2. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 86. Id. at 2. 
 87. Id. at 5 (Hayes, dissenting). 
 88. Id. at 4 (Hayes, dissenting). 
 89. Id. at 5. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 92. Id. 
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while others were not concerted.
93
 Ultimately, the posts that led to the 
employee‘s termination were the ones that did not qualify for protection 
under section 7, so the employer prevailed on that point.
94
 This was the 
Board‘s first review of an ALJ decision on social media and section 7, and 
the variety of findings makes it particularly instructive as to what online 
activity is concerted. 
The dispute began when the employer, a BMW car dealership, 
announced a sales event that would offer hot dogs, cookies, and chips to 
customer-attendees.
95
 After a meeting with the general sales manager to 
discuss the event, several car salespersons discussed their disappointment 
about the quality of food being offered, and their concern that without a 
better menu, the event might not help them earn much money in 
commissions.
96
  
At the event, the employee took photos of his fellow co-workers 
holding hot dogs, water, and Doritos, and said that they would be posted 
on his Facebook page.
97
 Less than a week later, the same employee took 
pictures of a Land Rover for sale after it accidentally ended up in a pond 
adjacent the premises during a test drive.
98
 
The employee uploaded the pictures from the BMW event and the 
Land Rover accident to Facebook.
99
 He wrote comments below some of 
the pictures, including: ―I was happy to see Knauz went ‗All Out‘ for the 
most important launch of a new BMW in years‖; ―No, that‘s not 
champagne or wine, it‘s 8 oz. water‖; and, underneath the picture of the 
Land Rover, ―This is your car: This is your car on drugs.‖100 
Two days later, several supervisors at the dealership met with the 
employee to discuss his online activity.
101
 When the supervisors asked him 
what he was thinking when he posted the pictures and comments, the 
employee responded by saying, ―It‘s none of your business,‖ and ―[I] 
wasn‘t thinking anything.‖102 The dealership supervisors explained that the 
pictures had ―thoroughly embarrassed . . . everybody that works at 
 
 
 93. 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164 (2012). 
 94. Id. at 1 n.1. 
 95. Id. at 7. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 7–8. 
 101. Id. at 8. 
 102. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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BMW.‖103 After considering the matter further, the dealership discharged 
the employee six days later.
104
 
The ALJ found that posting the pictures of salespersons eating hot dogs 
at the BMW sales event was a protected concerted activity because at a 
company meeting other employees had discussed the inadequate menu, 
and because the event ―could have had an effect upon his 
compensation.‖105 The pictures of the Land Rover in the pond, however, 
were not protected.
106
 Because the ALJ believed that the unprotected Land 
Rover pictures were the reason for the termination, the employee 
ultimately was not protected under the NLRA.
107
  
In considering whether the activity should lose protection for any 
reason, the ALJ noted the ―mocking and sarcastic‖ tone of the comments 
to the pictures. However, the language did not rise to a level that 
warranted removing protection.
108
 
When the case went on appeal to the NLRB, the Board adopted in full 
the ALJ‘s finding that the employee was terminated ―solely because of his 
unprotected Facebook postings about an auto accident at a Land Rover 
dealership.‖109 As a result, it added no insight as to what constitutes 
concerted activity beyond the ALJ‘s determination.  
3. Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille 
Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille
110
 is another one of the early decisions 
applying section 7 to employees‘ online activity, and as of publication the 
Board has not issued its own opinion on the case. The ALJ in Triple Play 
held that section 7 protected two restaurant employees who were 
terminated for their conversations on Facebook.
111
  
The problems between the parties began when employees filled out 
their tax returns and learned that they each unexpectedly owed several 
hundred dollars in state taxes.
112
 The restaurant‘s managers responded by 
arranging a meeting with their account and payroll company to discuss the 
issue, but before that meeting took place, the employees took their 
 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 105. Id. at 10. 
 106. Id. at 10–11. 
 107. Id. at 11. 
 108. Id. at 10. 
 109. Id. at 1 n.1. 
 110. 2012 WL 76862 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Jan. 3, 2012). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
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problems to Facebook.
113
 One employee wrote a message, viewable to the 
public, on a former co-workers Facebook wall, stating: ―Maybe someone 
should do the owners of Triple Play a favor and buy it from them. They 
can‘t even do the tax paperwork correctly!!! Now I owe money . . . 
Wtf!!!!‖114 Four people who viewed the post were other employees or 
patrons of Triple Play, and they contributed to the discussion by adding 
seventeen comments beneath the employee‘s message.115 Some of the 
comments were offensive or used foul language,
116
 but others were civil 
and suggested next steps.
117
 The discussion also mentioned the upcoming 
meeting, with the employee who started the discussion writing, ―Well 
discuss good because I won‘t be there to hear it. And let me know what his 
excuse is.‖118 One employee clicked the ―Like‖ button attached to the 
original post, which automatically placed a message underneath it that 
indicated that he ―like[s] this.‖119 
The employer discovered the discussion soon after it went online, and 
the employee who made the first post was fired one day later.
120
 When the 
employee who clicked the ―Like‖ button returned to work, the employer 
met with him to ask if he had a problem with the company.
121
 The 
employee ―replied that he had no such problems.‖122 The restaurant 
manager explained that he thought the online posts and comments 
constituted ―defamation,‖ and then discharged the employee who clicked 
the ―Like‖ button.123 
The ALJ held that terminating the employees was an unfair labor 
practice under the NLRA.
124
 He concluded that the post was concerted 
activity because several employees had spoken to the restaurant about the 
tax issue previously, and because the parties had scheduled a meeting with 
the payroll administrator to discuss it further.
125
 The comments 
―specifically discussed issues they intended to raise at this upcoming 
 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. (―You owe them money . . . that‘s fucked up‖; ―Ralph fucked up the paperwork . . . as per 
usual‖; ―[Ralph] probably pocketed it all from our paychecks‖; and ―I owe too. Such an asshole.‖). 
 117. Id. (―It‘s all Ralph‘s fault. He didn‘t do the paperwork right. I‘m calling the labor board to 
look into it because he still owes me about 2000 in paychecks.‖). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. For a description of the ―Like‖ button, see supra note 17. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
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meeting and avenues for possible complaints to government entities,‖ so 
therefore they were ―part of an ongoing sequence of events involving their 
withholdings and taxes owed to the State of Connecticut, and [were] 
therefore concerted activity.‖126 Furthermore, because clicking the ―Like‖ 
button was the other employee‘s means of assenting to the comments 
made, that act ―constituted participation in the discussion that was 
sufficiently meaningful as to rise to the level of concerted activity.‖127 
Next, the ALJ addressed whether the comments were sufficiently 
egregious to lose protection, or whether they should lose protection 
because two customers observed and participated in the exchange.
128
 The 
ALJ concluded that the activity did not lose protection under those 
circumstances.
129
 The decision did not hold the two employees responsible 
for some of the more profane phrases in the Facebook discussion, which 
were made only by former employees and customers.
130
 
In each of these cases, the ALJs or the board had to decide whether the 
discharged employees were engaged in protected concerted activity, and in 
each case there was at least some concerted activity. The Acting General 
Counsel has acknowledged that ―not all online activity is concerted.‖131 
However, the early decisions may have overlooked, failed to consider, or 
diminished the importance of key evidence suggesting that the online 
activity, in fact, did not fall under the purview of section 7. 
II. CONCERTED ACTIVITY ON SOCIAL NETWORKS 
Whether section 7 protects an employee‘s posts on an online social 
network first depends on whether that activity is concerted. As noted 
above, the NLRA does not offer a definition of concerted activity.
132
 
However, decades of case law have resulted in a few well-established 
principles that have made the term broader than its literal denotation, 
making the phrase more of ―a term of art rather than a factual 
description.‖133 
 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. ―Lafe Solomon, Business Lawyer, Share Views On Social Media Under NLRA and Other 
Laws,‖ Dailey Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at A-15 (Feb. 14, 2013). 
 132. See 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012) (definitions section of NLRA). 
 133. Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1153, 1160 (5th Cir. 1980).  
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A. The Legislative History and Historical Context of Section 7 Offers Few 
Hints about the Meaning of “Concerted Activity” 
The legislative history of section 7 gives courts little guidance as to 
what constitutes concerted activity for mutual aid or protection.
134
 When it 
enacted the statute against the backdrop of the labor movement of the 
1930‘s, ―Congress sought generally to equalize the bargaining power of 
the employee with that of his employer by allowing employees to band 
together in confronting an employer regarding the terms and conditions of 
their employment.‖135 Like other old statutes that courts struggle to apply 
to the Internet,
136
 the NLRA was conceived ―long before anyone could 
even imagine the possibility of the viral power‖ that comes with 
communicating on the Internet.
137
 As a result, the statute‘s language and 
history give few hints as to the scope of its protection when new 
situations, such as those in the social networking cases, make their way to 
the courts. However, nothing in the purpose or history of the NLRA 
suggests that employee activity on social networks should be categorically 
unprotected under section 7. Case law arising from offline concerted 
conduct is the best guide to understanding when online activity qualifies as 
concerted 
 
 
 134. See NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 834 (1984). (―[T]here is nothing in the 
legislative history of § 7 that specifically expresses the understanding of Congress in enacting the 
‗concerted activities‘ language . . . .‖). In NLRB v. City Disposal, the Court also noted that the 
concerted activity language actually was taken from the Clayton Act, which exempted some union 
activity from anti-trust laws, and the Norris-La Guardia Act of 1932. Id. at 834–35. 
 135. Id. at 835. The Congressional findings codified in 29 U.S.C. § 151 observed that ―[t]he 
inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or 
actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized . . . substantially burdens and affects the 
flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions.‖ See Robert A. Gorman & 
Matthew W. Finkin, The Individual and the Requirement of “Concert” Under the National Labor 
Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 286, 331–46 (1981) (discussing the history and policy of section 7). 
 136. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REV. 521 (2003) 
(criticizing judicial tendency to use a cyberspace-as-place metaphor to apply traditional property laws 
to the Internet); Megan M. La Belle, The Future of Internet-Related Personal Jurisdiction After 
Goodyear Dunlap Tires v. Brown and J. Mcintyre v. Nicastro, 15 NO. 7 J. INTERNET L. 3 (2012) 
(discussing an emerging issue of personal jurisdiction and the Internet). Some commentators might be 
inclined to call for an amendment to the NLRA to solve the problem of employee Internet chatter. See, 
e.g., Bielan, supra note 39, at 182–83. However, sometimes Internet-era laws create further 
ambiguities and questions. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and 
“Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596 (2003) (addressing varying 
interpretations of statutes that prohibit ―unauthorized access‖ to computers). 
 137. Jim Evans, Column: Social Networking Rants—An Employee Right?, COSHOCTON TRIB., 
Nov. 21, 2010, at A7. 
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B. Under the Rule from Meyers, a Single Statement by an Individual Can 
Be Concerted Activity 
Although a person cannot ―‗act in concert with himself,‘‖ section 7 
protects individual acts in two principle circumstances.
138
 First, it protects 
an individual employee who acts ―with or on the authority of other 
employees, and not solely by and on behalf of the employee himself.‖139 
Second, it protects individual action by an employee who seeks to initiate, 
induce, or prepare for group action.
140
 Under this second scenario, courts 
have protected as ―concerted activity‖ comments by an individual 
employee that expresses his or her dissatisfaction with something in the 
workplace. As one court explained in the context of grievances under a 
collective bargaining agreement:  
Organized and protected complaints will often develop from the 
dissatisfaction of an individual employee; the employee‘s initial 
protestations do not forfeit protection under the Act merely because 
they precede union involvement or concerted activity. If the 
employee actually proceeds on behalf of other employees, or at least 
with the intent to induce group action, in the presentation of work-
 
 
 138. McLean Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 689 F.2d 605, 608 (6th Cir. 1982) (protecting under section 
7 truck drivers who refused to drive a truck that they believed to be unsafe). 
 139. Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers I), 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984). This type of protected activity 
is not the main focus of this Note, because most online posts will not take the form of one employee 
taking action to change the workplace on behalf of others. Hispanics United could possibly be 
characterized as one employee acting on behalf of others by asking them how they felt about an issue 
prior to a meeting, but that act is more naturally described as preparation for further concerted 
activity. See infra note 140. For cases where individual activity was protected because one employee 
took action on behalf of others, see, e.g., NLRB v. Duquesne Elec. & Mfg. Co., 518 F.2d 701 (3d. Cir. 
1975) (employees who designated a spokesperson to present grievance to supervisor engaged in 
concerted activity); Air Contact Transp., Inc., 340 N.L.R.B. 688, 695 (2003) (employee engaged in 
concerted activity when, at a company meeting, he wanted to ask ―some questions on behalf of 
[himself] and [his] co-workers‖ regarding wages and benefits (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Neff-Perkins Co., 315 N.L.R.B. 1229, 1232 (1994) (questions to management about employee wages 
and quality of equipment were concerted because they implicated ―areas of common concern to all 
employees‖). 
 140. Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 887 (1986); see also Owens-Corning 
Fiberglas Corp. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1357, 1365 (4th Cir. 1969) (―The activity of a single employee in 
enlisting the support of his fellow employees for their mutual aid and protection is as much ‗concerted 
activity‘ as is ordinary group activity.‖). Professor Morris argues that this standard should be 
abandoned. Morris, supra note 37. However, it is still imposed by the NLRB and courts. See MJ 
Mueller, LLC, 352 N.L.R.B. 525 (2008) (―‗Such individual action is concerted as long as it is engaged 
in with the object of initiating or inducing . . . group action.‘‖) (quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. & 
Paper, 339 N.L.R.B. 916, 918 (2003)). 
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related grievances arguably based within the collective bargaining 
agreement, then the activity is protected by the Act.
141
 
This reasoning recognizes that change for a group acting in concert in the 
workplace often arises from one person‘s observation of an unfavorable 
condition of employment. Although a purpose of the NLRA was ―to 
protect the rights of workers to act together to better their working 
conditions,‖142 the genesis of that movement begins with the action, words, 
or idea of an individual.
143
 
Accordingly, the definition of concerted activity is ―expansive enough 
to include individual activity which is connected to collective activity.‖144 
There are, however, a few limitations to this seemingly broad definition of 
concerted. ―‗Mere griping‘ about a condition of employment is not 
protected, but when the ‗griping‘ coalesces with expression inclined to 
produce group or representative action, the statute protects the activity.‖145 
Additionally, the individual‘s actions must concern something more than 
personal interests that are his and his alone.
146
 
In the social media cases, the NLRB General Counsel has argued that 
an individual‘s online speech is concerted activity by relying on the 
Meyers cases.
147
 The dispute in Meyers arose when a truck driver 
complained to his employer about faulty brakes on his company vehicle.
148
 
Another employee who subsequently drove the truck made the same 
complaint to management.
149
 The first truck driver was discharged after he 
received an official inspection of the vehicle, which confirmed his 
suspicion about the faulty brakes and prompted his discharge because, 
 
 
 141. McLean Trucking, 689 F.2d at 608. 
 142. NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962). 
 143. Professor Morris suggests a broader standard that, consistent with the statutory language of 
section 7, would better protect an employee‘s right to engage in concerted activity: ―[Employees] must 
be protected in any of their group conversations that relate to conditions of employment, absent some 
overriding legitimate employer interest requiring a limit to such conversation.‖ Morris, supra note 37, 
at 1693. Professor Morris argues that the ―limit‖ should not be based on ―whether the conversation in 
question has reached the advanced stage of looking toward group action,‖ but rather ―on such factors 
as time, place, and interference with productive work.‖ Id. 
 144. Id. at 1717 (quoting Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. at 885). 
 145. Hugh H. Wilson Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1345, 1348 (3d Cir. 1969). 
 146. See Pelton Casteel, Inc. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 23, 28–29 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding that one 
employee‘s complaints about job risks and overtime were unprotected personal griping because the 
complaints were not directed at inducting collective actions or made on behalf of a group).  
 147. Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers I), 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984), rev’d sub nom Prill v. NLRB, 755 
F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985), remanded to Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882 (1986), 
aff’d sub nom Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 148. Prill, 755 F.2d at 943. 
 149. Id. 
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according to his employer, ―we can‘t have you calling the cops like this all 
the time.‖150 
The court of appeals held that the employee was not engaged in 
concerted activity. First, the court confirmed that concerted activity 
―encompass[es] [only] those circumstances where individual employees 
seek to initiate or to induce or to prepare for group action.‖151 Next, the 
court found that the employee did not meet this standard because he ―acted 
on his own, without inducing or preparing for group action.‖152 Finally, the 
court of appeals explained that the employee could have benefited from 
section 7 if he had ―simply gotten together with his co-workers to 
complain about the violation of statutory safety provisions.‖153  
Despite its ultimate holding in favor of the employer, Meyers defined 
concerted activity in terms broad enough to encompass many individual 
statements and actions that take place on and off the Internet. The rest of 
this section will detail some of the other limitations on concerted activity, 
highlighting areas where online posts may not qualify for protection. In 
particular, online concerted activity may not be concerted if it is an 
―individual gripe,‖ or if it is not ―inciting, inducing, or preparing‖ for 
future concerted activity. 
C. An Employee’s Individual Gripes Are Not Concerted Activity 
Just like discussions that take place offline, some social network 
conversations are individual gripes, not concerted activity.
154
 Many 
 
 
 150. Id. at 945. 
 151. Prill, 835 F.2d at 1484 (quoting Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. at 887 (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 152. Id. at 1485. He acted alone when he complained to his employer, and although on another 
occasion he overheard another employee complain about the same problem, there was ―no evidence 
that anything else occurred.‖ Id. (quoting Meyers, 268 N.L.R.B. at 498) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 153. Id. In confirming the framework that stands today, Meyers II adopted its rule and reasoning 
from an earlier Third Circuit case, Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1964). In 
that case, an employee was terminated for talking to other employees about their rights regarding pay, 
vacation time, and other company policies. Id. at 684. The court held that the activity was not 
concerted because there was ―no evidence that any question of group action entered into the 
conversations.‖ Id. at 685. Although many communications can receive protection because ―almost 
any concerted activity for mutual aid or protection has to start with some kind of communication 
between individuals,‖ the Act does not protect activity ―when it appears from the conversations 
themselves that no group action of any kind is intended, contemplated, or even referred to.‖ Id.; see 
also MJ Mueller, LLC, 352 N.L.R.B. 525 (2008) (one employee concerned about pay policies was 
engaged in concerted activities when he contacted co-workers to initiate action). 
 154. The Acting General Counsel has also acknowledged that individual griping that occurs online 
should not receive protection. See ―Lafe Solomon, Business Lawyer, Share Views On Social Media 
Under NLRA and Other Laws,‖ Dailey Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at A-15 (Feb. 14, 2013). 
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employees who take to Facebook to discuss their problems at work will 
likely complain about something that only affects them as individuals but 
does not concern any group.
155
 ―Purely personal griping does not fall 
within the scope of protected, concerted activity.‖156 In NLRB v. Deauville 
Hotel, the court held that an employee did not engage in concerted activity 
when he complained about a new, lower-ranking job to which he had been 
assigned.
157
 The activity did not receive protection because the issue at 
work affected him alone, and not any other co-worker.
158
 Rather than 
involving concerted activity for mutual aid or protection, cases like 
Deauville Hotel are examples of an individual‘s unprotected activity for 
individual protection. 
Given the variety of subjects that employees discuss through online 
social networks,
159
 courts may encounter a special difficulty when they try 
to decide whether a social network post is individual griping or concerted 
activity. In Hispanics United, for example, the original Facebook post 
arguably was not concerted at the outset because it was motivated by the 
employee‘s individual issue with a co-worker who had been critical of her 
job performance. However, because she called for group support and 
because the other employees noted that they had a problem with the same 
employee, there was more support for the argument that it was concerted 
activity.
160
 In contrast, the posts at issue in Triple Play clearly were not 
―individual gripes‖ because they involved a tax issue that was from the 
start common to several employees.
161
 
 
 
 155. Based on case law and semantics, this requirement might be better described as an element of 
the ―mutual aid or protection‖ requirement. See Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 
885 (1986); Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978); William R. Corbett, Waiting for the Labor 
Law of the Twenty-First Century: Everything Old Is New Again, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 259, 
282–83 (2002) (describing the ―mutual aid or protection‖ standard). 
 156. Rockwell Int‘l Corp. v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 1530, 1535 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that employee 
engaged in protected, concerted activity when she spoke on behalf of her co-workers regarding an 
issue at a company meeting); see also Ryder Tank Lines, Inc., 135 N.L.R.B. 936 (1962) (one 
employee‘s complaint about insufficient compensation for driving on a particular trip was purely 
personal, not concerted); enforcement denied on other grounds, 310 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1962). 
 157. 751 F.2d 1562, 1571 (11th Cir. 1985). 
 158. Id. See also Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1949) (employee who 
circulated petition calling for discharge of foreman was not engaged in concerted activity because, 
although other employees signed the petition, the problems at work involved only the individual 
worker and the foreman, not other employees). Professor Morris criticizes the court in Joanna Cotton 
Mills for ―overreact[ing] to what it perceived to be an ‗unwarranted interference with management.‘‖ 
Morris, supra note 37, at 1695. 
 159. People are more willing to share information online, even if is embarrassing. See Victoria 
Vogt, Why Do People Share Embarrassing Information Online?, HOWSTUFFWORKS (July 8, 2009), 
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/internet/social-networking/information/share-information-online.htm. 
 160. See supra text accompanying notes 70–71. 
 161. See supra text accompanying note 114. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1564 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:1543 
 
 
 
 
Many disgruntled employees who decide to discuss their work 
problems online will post about something that does not affect anyone 
beyond themselves. Judges must examine carefully the facts of each case 
to discern the fine line between concerted activity and individual griping. 
If it meets that hurdle, then the next issue is whether the post is seeking to 
induce group action. 
D. To Be Concerted Activity, the Employee Social Network Activity Must 
Be Performed with the Object of “Inciting, Inducing, or Preparing for 
Group Action” 
Although an employee‘s online social network activity sometimes can 
be concerted, ―to qualify as such, it must appear at the very least that it 
was engaged in with the object of initiating or inducing or preparing for 
group action or that it had some relation to group action in the interest of 
the employees.‖162 To fulfill this requirement, the employee must present 
some evidence that the online discussion may have led to further concerted 
action for mutual aid or protection.
163
 However, as the Board pointed out 
in Hispanics United, ―the ‗object or goal of initiating, inducing or 
preparing for group action does not have to be stated explicitly when 
employees communicate.‘‖164 Rather, ―a concerted objective may be 
inferred from a variety of circumstances in which employees might 
discuss or seek to address concerns about working conditions.‖165 
Nevertheless, under this framework social network posts that are not the 
genesis of more activity should not qualify for protection. 
The early cases illustrate overlooked differences between posts that are 
intended to precede future activity, and ones that are not. In Hispanics 
United, the ALJ held that the employees met the standard for initiating, 
inducing, or preparing for group action because they ―were taking a first 
step towards group action to defend themselves against the accusations 
 
 
 162. Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964). This requirement is not 
as strenuous as it may sound; protesting employees do not need to make a ―specific demand‖ 
immediately before or after taking concerted action to make a change in the workplace. In Washington 
Aluminum, the Supreme Court held that employees were protected under section 7 even though they 
did not make a ―specific demand‖ when they walked off the job. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 
370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962). 
 163. Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers I), 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984). See also Indiana Gear Works v. 
NLRB, 371 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1967) (posting cartoons at work was not done for purpose of inducing 
or preparing any group action, but rather for employee‘s own personal gratification). 
 164. Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, at 3 (2012) (quoting Relco 
Locomotives, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 37, at 17 (2012)). 
 165. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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they could reasonably believe [a co-worker] was going to make to 
management.‖166 The employee‘s Facebook post asked her co-workers 
how they felt about an issue in preparation for an anticipated complaint to 
management by their co-worker.
167
 Under the standard from Meyers, this 
was a protected concerted activity because it solicited advice to prepare for 
group action that the employees would take at the meeting.
168
 
Courts may face issues in determining an employee‘s intent to induce 
concerted activity among co-workers when the post involves an event that 
occurred in the past. The employee in Karl Knauz posted pictures of a 
sales event that qualified as concerted activity, but these arguably may not 
have intended or contemplated future group action because he was 
complaining about a one-time past event that could not possibly change.
169
 
The judge held that some of the posts were concerted because the 
Facebook pictures and comments were posted to protest an issue that 
―could have had an effect upon his compensation,‖ reasoning that a more 
elegant event may have made it easier for the salespeople to earn 
commissions.
170
 However, no matter what action was taken, concerted or 
individual, the car dealership could not return to the event and tell the hot 
dog vendor to go home. Because the activity looked forward to no further 
action but merely complained about something in the past that was not 
readily changeable in the present, it likely should not have been 
characterized as concerted. 
Triple Play illustrates how a gripe can quickly develop intent for more 
action to solve a problem in the present. The conversation at issue began 
when one employee wrote a sarcastic, public remark on a former co-
worker‘s Facebook wall.171 This alone would not seem like protected 
concerted activity because the discussion was between a current employee 
and a former employee and was more of a gripe than a call to action. The 
interaction did not occur with any intention of inciting, inducing, or 
preparing for action: it was one employee just venting a problem to a 
friend. However, the nature of the conversation changed as more 
employees commented on the original post and added their own 
information about the workplace payroll tax issue.
172
 At that point, several 
employees indicated that they shared the same problem and that they 
 
 
 166. Id. at 9. 
 167. See supra note 69. 
 168. See supra note 73. 
 169. See supra text accompanying note 95. 
 170. Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164, at 10 (2012). 
 171. See supra text accompanying note 114. 
 172. See supra note 116 and text accompanying notes 115–19. 
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wanted to do something about it. When one employee mentioned the 
upcoming meeting to discuss the issue,
173
 it almost certainly tipped the 
balance closer to the concerted activity that was clear at an earlier point in 
Hispanics United. 
Furthermore, in each of these early decisions the Board and ALJs could 
have given greater weight to statements of the employees themselves; 
some readily admitted to their employers that they had no intention of 
taking concerted action after publishing their comments online.
174
 In cases 
where courts extend protection, the employees ultimately manifest their 
intent to seek change in the workplace by presenting their grievances to a 
supervisor
175
 or considering some other action toward their goal. The 
social networking cases gave little weight to the employees‘ own 
statements indicating that no further action was intended.
176
 In Triple Play, 
where the employer discharged the employee who ―Liked‖ a sarcastic 
Facebook post, the employee said that he had ―no . . . problems‖ with the 
supervisor or the restaurant.
177
 Similarly, in Karl Knauz, the employee told 
his supervisor that the Facebook posts were none of BMW‘s business and 
that he ―wasn‘t thinking anything‖ when he put the pictures and sarcastic 
comments online.
178
 Unlike many other cases where courts have extended 
 
 
 173. See supra text accompanying note 118. 
 174.  
An inquiry into the concerted nature of conduct should not focus solely upon the group nature 
of the complaints. Instead, it also should air what the employees decided to do about those 
complaints. Here, while there was evidence that drivers were irritated by working conditions, 
there is nothing to indicate that they had decided to act upon those annoyances. 
Manimark Corp. v. NLRB, 7 F.3d 547, 551 (6th Cir. 1993). In Manimark, the Court held that no 
protected concerted activity occurred where, inter alia, the employee refused an invitation from 
management to follow up on his complaints with a group meeting to discuss the issues. Id. at 551–52. 
 175. See, e.g., NRLB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962) (concerted activity occurred 
when employees walked off the job without permission because they wanted to the company to 
provide better heating at work); NLRB v. Duquesne Elec. & Mfg. Co., 518 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1975) 
(concerted activity occurred when employees selected a representative to present grievances to the 
company vice president and owner); Sutherland v. NLRB, 646 F.2d 1273, 1274 (8th Cir. 1981) 
(employees who approached supervisor made it clear that they were not satisfied with wages). 
 176. Of course, the reason an employee might not tell the employer about future activity is not 
because none is planned, but because of feared retaliation. Either way, this is a question of fact that 
could be further explored in the ALJ fact-finding process, and in some cases may be relevant to the 
outcome. 
 177. Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille, No. 34-CA-12915, 2012 WL 76862 (N.L.R.B. Div. of 
Judges Jan. 3, 2012). On the other hand, because there were other employees with the same issue who 
planned to discuss the matter further with management, the manifest weight of the evidence probably 
suggests that their activity should receive section 7 protection. See supra text accompanying notes 115, 
118. 
 178. Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164, at 8 (2011). Often, both employees and 
other people who post information online do not think about or have any particular intent when they 
share the information. Consider the case of one employee who was discharged because of her 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss5/7
  
 
 
 
 
2013] SOCIAL NETWORKS AND THE NLRA 1567 
 
 
 
 
section 7 protection, these statements are evidence that the employees who 
made the posts did not intend to take their grievances from the Internet to 
the workplace; this should receive greater consideration from the courts. 
Based on the statute‘s goal of protecting employee efforts to make the 
workplace better, it makes little sense to extend protection to those who 
indicate to their employers that they have no interest in inducing future 
concerted activity. 
Finally, the early cases indicate that the Board or ALJs may want to 
distance their holdings from this restriction on the concerted activity 
definition. Although the ALJ in Hispanics United based his holding on the 
―inciting, inducing, or preparing for action‖ standard, he offered an 
argument that would erode that rule.
179
 The ALJ suggested that ―[i]t is 
irrelevant to this case that the discriminatees were not trying to change 
their working conditions and that they did not communicate their concerns 
to [their employer].‖180 In the ―leading case‖ cited to support this 
proposition, the NLRB reached its rationale by disapproving of the well-
settled rule from Meyers: ―In agreeing that the employee activity in issue 
here was concerted within the meaning of the Act, Chairman Gould and 
Member Browning decline to rely on, and question the continuing vitality 
of Meyers Industries.‖181 This result overruled the ALJ, who had relied on 
Meyers to reach the opposite conclusion in the case.
182
 
In sum, the ALJ and Board used Meyers as the ―appropriate analytical 
framework‖ for disposing of the case.183 However, to argue that employees 
need not be ―trying to change their working conditions‖ to receive 
protection, the opinion relied on a case that sought to depart from the 
Meyers standard. If Meyers still places a meaningful limitation on what 
constitutes concerted activity, future decisions should require some 
evidence that the employee speech at least could have begun an effort to 
change workplace conditions. 
 
 
Facebook post. ―It was my own fault,‖ she said. ―I did write the message. But I had no idea that 
something that, to me is very small, could result in my losing my job . . . I lost my job because of a 
Facebook status.‖ Eric Frazier, Facebook Post Costs Waitress her Job, CHARLOTTEOBSERVER.COM 
(May 17, 2010), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2010/05/17/1440447/facebook-post-costs-waitress-
her.html. 
 179. See supra note 71. 
 180. Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, at 9 (2012). 
 181. Aroostook Cnty. Reg‘l Ophthalmology Ctr., 317 N.L.R.B. 218, 220 n.12 (1995). In that case, 
the Board held that employee complaints to each other concerning schedule changes, which were not 
brought to the supervisor‘s attention, constituted protected concerted activity. Id. at 220. 
 182. Id. at 220. The ALJ stated that ―where the employee activity at issue consists only of talk, for 
that activity to be protected by Section 7 ‗it must appear that it was engaged in with the object of 
initiating group action.‘‖ Id. at 228. 
 183. Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, at 1. 
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E. Without Giving Careful Attention to the Case Law Limitations on 
Concerted Activity, Any Social Network Post Might Qualify for 
Protection 
The broadest reading of section 7 would suggest that any social 
network post about a problem at work should constitute concerted activity. 
Social networks allow users instantly to direct communications at each 
other.
184
 Even when a user uploads a message without directing it to 
anyone in particular,
185
 it may be viewable by anyone on the Internet,
186
 or 
at least to co-workers, customers, and ―friends‖ within the user‘s network. 
On social networking sites, when one user speaks, many others listen. The 
no longer secret ingredient to Facebook‘s success is its ability to connect 
users all over the globe in an experience that emulates real world 
interaction.
187
 Because anyone, including co-workers, can view a person‘s 
post that says, ―I HATE my boss,‖ an overly-broad reading of the statute 
could classify such expression as concerted activity. It is more likely that 
online communications are concerted when a user directs them toward a 
co-worker, as opposed to another friend or to no one at all.
188
 
In any section 7 dispute, the distinction between concerted activity and 
non-protected activity can be subtle. The precedents are adaptable to the 
new medium, with careful application. The NLRA can survive the test of 
time, but section 7 will not apply to every social network activity that 
employees take. 
III. ―MUTUAL AID OR PROTECTION‖ INCLUDES ACTIVITY THAT WILL 
AFFECT THE ―TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT‖ 
Even if employees act in concert, that ―is not sufficient by itself to 
show that they engaged in that concerted activity which is protected by the 
Act.‖189 The second of the three basic requirements for protection 
 
 
 184. Features for sharing include ―tagging‖ each other in posts and commenting on each other‘s 
activity, just like the employees in Triple Play. See supra text accompanying notes 115–19. 
 185. This was the type of post made by the employee in Karl Knauz Motors. See supra text 
accompanying notes 99–100. 
 186. See supra text accompanying notes 15–19. 
 187. See, e.g., THE SOCIAL NETWORK (Columbia Pictures 2010) (―People want to go online and 
check out their friends, so why not build a website that offers that? Friends, pictures, profiles, 
whatever you can visit, browse around, maybe it‘s someone you just met at a party . . . . I‘m talking 
about taking the entire social experience of college and putting it online‖). 
 188. After all, section 7 ―extend[s] to concerted activity which in its inception involves only a 
speaker and a listener, for such activity is an indispensible preliminary step to employee self-
organization.‖ Root-Carlin, Inc., 92 N.L.R.B. 1313, 1314 (1951). 
 189. New River Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 945 F.2d 1290, 1294 (4th Cir. 1991). 
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mandates that the object of the activity be for the purpose of ―mutual aid 
or protection.‖190  
A few courts have given some insight about what it means for 
employees to take action for mutual aid or protection. In Eastex, Inc. v. 
NLRB, the Supreme Court suggested that ―some concerted activity bears a 
less immediate relationship to employees‘ interests as employees than 
other such activity . . . . [A]t some point the relationship becomes so 
attenuated that an activity cannot fairly be deemed to come within the 
‗mutual aid or protection‘ clause.‖191 Some courts have interpreted this 
language ―to require the showing of a ‗nexus‘ between the activity and 
‗employees‘ interests as employees,‘‖ but overall, this has not imposed a 
significant restriction on what is protected by section 7.
192
 The statute 
protects all employees who ―seek to improve terms and conditions of their 
employment or otherwise improve their lot as employees.‖193 Without fear 
of retaliation, employees can seek to change a wide variety of workplace 
conditions ―related to wages, hours or terms and conditions of 
employment.‖194 For example, in Hoytuck Corp.,195 the NLRB extended 
section 7 protection to employees who complained about a supervisor 
because it was ―evident that [the supervisor‘s] conduct had an impact on 
employee working conditions.‖196 
As with the ―concerted activity‖ requirement, in some of the social 
networking cases the Board may have erred in finding that employees 
 
 
 190. ―Mutual aid or protection‖ is not defined by the Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012). 
 191. 437 U.S. 556, 567–68 (1978). 
 192. Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. NLRB, 484 F.3d 601, 606 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see also 
Raymond T. Mak, City Disposal Systems and the Interboro Doctrine: The Evolution of the 
Requirement of “Concerted Activity” Under the National Labor Relations Act, 2 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 
265, 268 n.20 (1985) (noting that this phrase has been interpreted broadly ―to include almost any 
activity which somehow affects the well-being of the employees as a group‖). 
 193. Eastex, 437 U.S. at 565. The employees in Eastex wanted to distribute a newsletter that 
would encourage their coworkers to support various worker-friendly political causes in their state. Id. 
The Court held that this was protected activity for mutual aid and protection even though it sought 
political change, and not anything from the employer. Id. 
 194. Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, at 9 (2012); see, e.g., NLRB v. 
Leslie Metal Arts Co., 509 F.2d 811, 814 (6th Cir. 1975) (protecting concerted activity taken under 
circumstances where ―an employer‘s failure to maintain discipline rises to the point of threatening 
employee safety‖); see also New River Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 945 F.2d 1290, 1294 (4th Cir. 1991) 
(―The conditions of employment which employees may seek to improve are sufficiently well identified 
to include wages, benefits, working hours, the physical environment, dress codes, assignments, 
responsibilities, and the like.‖). 
 195. 285 N.L.R.B. 904 (1987). 
 196. Id. at 904 n.3. Another case distinguished Joanna Cotton Mills v. NLRB on the basis that 
there was ―no evidence of any relation between the employees‘ expressed concerns and working 
conditions.‖ Atl.-Pac. Const. Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 52 F.3d 260, 263 (9th Cir. 1995) (conduct of 
immediate supervisor affects working conditions). 
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engaged in activity for the purpose of ―mutual aid or protection.‖ In 
Hispanics United, the individual employee‘s grievance implicated a 
condition of employment because it involved a commonly-shared problem 
that employees had in dealing with one particular co-worker.
197
 Triple 
Play is another clear case of activity that involved a term and condition of 
employment, because the employee‘s online complaint was related to an 
alleged mistake that the employer made in taxes that would affect the 
income of several employees.
198
 
On the other hand, a few other precedents indicate that the activity 
protected in Karl Knauz may not fulfill the mutual aid or protection 
requirement. In New River Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, the Fourth Circuit 
declined to extend section 7 protection to employees who posted around 
the workplace a letter that satirically criticized management‘s decision to 
provide ice cream to employees to celebrate a new agreement that the 
company reached with a supplier.
199
 The court concluded that the letter, 
although indisputably concerted activity, was not an act for mutual aid or 
protection.
200
 Rather, ―[t]he expression of criticism about management or, 
in this case, the value of a one-time gift or expression of appreciation from 
management is not a condition of employment that employees have a 
protected right to seek to improve.‖201 Because the letter did not address 
wages, hours, or some other term or condition of employment, it was not 
protected.
202
  
The employee activity in Karl Knauz is too similar to New River to be 
distinguished. In both cases, the satirical activity criticized a one-time 
management decision that occurred in the past and had no ongoing effect 
on the terms and conditions of employment. As a result, it is unlikely that 
the BMW employee engaged in protected activity when he uploaded 
pictures of the event to Facebook, despite the attenuated connection 
between the pictures and the event. Although some comments on the 
 
 
 197. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. Although, as discussed previously, the ALJ 
readily pointed out that ―the discriminatees were not trying to change their working conditions,‖ this 
language seems to refer more to their intent to engage in concerted activity than whether the 
contemplated acts would be for the purpose of ―mutual aid or protection.‖ Hispanics United, 359 
N.L.R.B. No. 37, at 9. 
 198. ―It is well established that an employee is guaranteed the right to protest wages, as was 
allegedly done in this case, under the NLRA.‖ Anco Constr. Co. v. Freeman, 693 P.2d 1183, 1185 
(Kan. 1985). 
 199. 945 F.2d 1290, 1294 (4th Cir. 1991). The letter read in part: ―The employees of New River 
would like to express their great appreciation of the 52 flavors of left over ice cream from the closed 
Meadow Gold Plant. It has boosted moral [sic] tremendously.‖ Id. at 1292. 
 200. Id. at 1295. 
 201. Id. at 1294. 
 202. Id. at 1295. 
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Internet may complain about conditions of employment that could be 
changed, these should be distinguished carefully from posts that involve 
only one-time events at work that no concerted action could possibly 
affect. 
Although the ―mutual aid or protection‖ element is unarguably broad 
and less litigated than the requirement of ―concerted activity,‖ courts 
should keep a careful eye out for employee complaints about one-time, 
past events that may not be considered a ―term or condition of 
employment.‖ Whether or not the activity happens in concert, complaints 
about something that cannot be changed do little to advance the purpose of 
the act because they cannot make the workplace better. That was precisely 
the situation in Karl Knauz, where no matter how the employee acted, the 
employer could not go back and improve the event that the employee and 
his coworkers were upset about. Particularly in cases where employees 
send information to social networks from their phones almost as soon as 
the events occur,
203
 it is more likely that the events will not constitute a 
term or condition of employment. 
IV. SOME ACTIVITY, INCLUDING CERTAIN DISPARAGING ACTS, LOSE 
PROTECTION UNDER THE ACT 
Even if employees act in concert for their own mutual aid or protection, 
they will lose protection under the act in certain cases. Employees may not 
effectively seize their employer‘s business by remaining on the job but 
choosing what tasks they wish to do and not do,
204
 or by slowing down 
their work.
205
 Violence and threats are not tolerated,
206
 and neither are 
illegal activities such as misappropriation of confidential information.
207
 
At the same time, ―[t]he employee‘s right to engage in concerted activity 
may permit some leeway for impulsive behavior, which must be balanced 
against the employer‘s right to maintain order and respect.‖208 
All of these categories are easily applicable to social media cases, but 
none arose in the ones that have emerged so far. Two contrasting cases 
 
 
 203. General Counsel‘s Second Memo, supra note 3, at 31 (describing a case where an employee 
was terminated for uploading a comment about work from her cell phone). 
 204. NLRB v. J. I. Case Co., 198 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1952). 
 205. NRLB v. Robertson Indus., 560 F.2d 396 (9th Cir. 1976). 
 206. NRLB v. Red Top, Inc., 455 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1972). 
 207. See Texas Instruments, Inc. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 822, 832 (1st Cir. 1981) (―The presence or 
absence of subreption and misappropriation is certainly a significant factor in deciding whether 
employee conduct is a protected exercise of a section 7 right.‖). 
 208. Boaz Spinning Co. v. NLRB, 39 F.2d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1968). 
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about losing protection, however, are particularly relevant. In NLRB v. 
Owners Maintenance Corp.,
209
 two employees engaged in protected 
concerted action when they ―sought to organize and obtain concerted 
employee support through the distribution of leaflets‖ outside of their 
office.
210
 In contrast, in NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, International 
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (Jefferson Standard),
211
 the Supreme 
Court held that employees who distributed 5,000 leaflets disparaging their 
company during a labor dispute did not engage in concerted activity 
because the attack did not advance or refer to the objectives of the 
employee dispute.
212
  
The cases about employees giving out handbills are similar to those 
involving employee complaints on social networks because both involve 
an employee with a grievance who seeks change in the workplace by 
announcing the issue outside of the work environment. The question for 
courts is whether the online commentary falls closer to Jefferson Standard, 
where the attack on the employer made no reference to the ongoing 
dispute, or to Owners Maintenance Corp., where the flyers directly sought 
support through concerted activity to change a policy in the workplace. 
Once again, some of the early social networking cases seem to meet 
this requirement for concerted activity, while others are less clear. In 
Hispanics United and Triple Play, the employees specifically referenced 
the ongoing dispute at work in their online conversation. Even the 
protected pictures and comments made by the employee in Karl Knauz 
seemed to simply make fun of the employer‘s event rather than advance a 
constructive conversation about how to make change in the workplace, 
making them seem to fall closer to the leaflets in Jefferson Standard.
213
 
Although the employee arguably referred to a problem in the workplace by 
taking pictures of the mediocre food selection, similar to leaflets in 
Owners Maintenance, the pictures did little to advance the discussion of 
the issue and much to disparage the employer. In sum, posts to social 
networks that do not refer to workplace disputes but merely disparage the 
employer should not receive protection under the NLRA. 
 
 
 209. 581 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 210. Id. at 49. 
 211. 346 U.S. 464 (1953). 
 212. ―Their attack related itself to no labor practice of the company. It made no reference to 
wages, hours or working conditions.‖ Id. at 476. 
 213. See supra text accompanying notes 79–80. 
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V. COURTS SHOULD REQUIRE THE FORM OF THE CONCERTED ACTIVITY 
TO BE COMMENSURATE WITH THE OBJECT OF THE PROTEST AND NOT 
EXTEND PROTECTION TO EMPLOYEES‘ PUBLIC COMPLAINTS ON  
SOCIAL NETWORKS  
Even if the activities in social network cases are concerted and for 
mutual aid or protection under section 7, before extending protection 
courts should consider the form of the activities against their ability to 
create meaningful change in the workplace. The early cases involving 
social networks show that a broad application of section 7 will lead to 
adverse consequences for employers, but without substantially helping 
employees institute change in the workplace.
214
 The Board and ALJ 
decisions have extended protection to communications that have a 
minimal effect on employees‘ terms and conditions of employment. Even 
if the NLRB had not applied section 7 to protect the social media posts, 
the employees still could have engaged in concerted activity (and still used 
the Internet to do so) in a manner that would be equally effective at 
making change. 
A. Granting Section 7 Protection to Employees Who Post Publically 
Viewable Comments Online Will Not Further the Goals of the NLRA, 
but Will Needlessly Harm Employers. 
Employee disparagement on the Internet can bring plenty of 
unwelcome attention to employers, which is somewhat unfair to those who 
previously are unaware that there is a problem in the workplace.
215
 One 
popular entertainment website recognized that such unwanted publicity 
was funny enough to ―go viral‖ and increase traffic to their website, so it 
published a series of pictures of an attractive young woman writing a 
series of humorous complaints about her boss on a whiteboard.
216
 The 
 
 
 214. For example, in Hispanics United it is difficult to argue that one employee describing a 
workplace grievance to a former co-employee advances a cause to improve the terms or conditions of 
the workplace. Furthermore, the litany of comments underneath the post did virtually nothing but 
identify which employees were disgruntled or unenthusiastic about their job.  
 215. Of course, NLRB v. Washington Aluminum made clear that employees do not have to make a 
demand on their employer before taking concerted activity. 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962). In that case, 
however, the employer was well aware that the employees were leaving because of the cold—a move 
suggested by their very own foreman. Id. at 11. 
 216. Karen Auge & Daniel Petty, HOAX Online Erase-Board, Stick-It-to-the-Man Job Quitter Is 
Really a Colorado Actress, THE DENVER POST, Aug. 8, 2010, at A-01. When one law firm surveyed 
120 multinational employers, 43% of respondents reported employee misuse of social networks. More 
Than 75 Percent of Businesses Use Social Media, Nearly Half Do Not Have Social Networking 
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stunt worked, giving the website a moment in the spotlight as Internet 
users spread the material from one person to the next.
217
 The entire effort 
was a manufactured hoax, but it illustrates how one disgruntled employee 
complaining about her job online could have damaging effects on the 
employer. When customers saw the posts that were the subject of Triple 
Play, the effects may have been smaller, but were much more real.
218
 
If courts uphold the NLRB General Counsel‘s broad interpretation of 
section 7, employers will have little recourse to protect their business from 
disgruntled employees who take to the Internet to ―publicly bash[] the 
company, co-workers, and supervisors electronically.‖219 Because some 
social media posts are viewable to an uncountable number of people 
around the globe, employers‘ social media policies promote ―conveying a 
positive public image‖ and are ―based on the premise that employees have 
a responsibility to keep problems with co-workers and managers within 
the confines of the company and out of the public eye.‖220 The current use 
of section 7 to protect a wide variety of employee activity on social 
networks makes it difficult for employers to solve problems in-house and 
put forth a positive public image. In fact, if the employee‘s disparaging 
online activity falls under the protection of section 7, employers may run 
afoul of the law merely for asking their employees about it.
221
 Once the 
activity is deemed concerted, an employee can continue posting items on 
Facebook or Twitter indefinitely, with the employer left powerless to stop 
it.
222
 
 
 
Policies, PROSKAUER (July 14, 2011), http://www.proskauer.com/news/press-releases/july-14-2011/more 
-than-75-percent-of-businesses-use-social-media-nearly-half-do-not-have-social-networking-policies/. 
 217. Auge & Petty, supra note 216. 
 218. In Triple Play, several customers commented alongside the employees and former employees 
who engaged in the online discussion. Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille, No. 34-CA-12915, 2012 WL 
76862 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Jan. 3, 2012). The comments seemed to affect the customers‘ view of 
the employer, saying things such as: ―You owe them money . . . that‘s fucked up,‖ ―Yeah I really don‘t 
go to that place anymore,‖ and ―[the employer‘s restaurant is] way to expensive.‖ Id.  
 219. Evans, supra note 137. 
 220. Id. 
 221.  
We find [the employer‘s] questions about what had happened and why constitute unlawful 
interrogations when viewed in the context in which they were made. These interrogations 
were part of [the employer‘s] investigation into the waitresses‘ concerted activity and 
therefore cannot be separated from [the employer‘s] unlawful questions about the leader‘s 
specific identity, which were also part of the investigation.  
Club Monte Carlo Corp., 280 N.L.R.B. 257, 257 (1986).  
 222. In Kolkka, the Board held that a ―refusal to comply once with an unlawful order to cease 
engaging in Section 7 activity is not transformed into insubordination simply because the refusal is 
repeated each time the unlawful order is reiterated.‖ 335 N.L.R.B. 844, 849 (2001). 
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Giving employees unfettered discretion to post about the workplace—
even in a concerted manner—without consequences will also leave 
employers helpless to stop cyber-bullying and harassment between co-
workers. Although much attention has been given to cyber-bullying in 
schools because of its devastating effects,
223
 it exists among adults in the 
workforce as well.
224
 Under the NLRB and General Counsel‘s 
interpretation of the statute, an employer who takes action against online 
harassment between employees may risk violating section 7. 
As a result of these considerations, social media may call for different 
protection than other forms of public employee concerted activity. 
Previously, employees were protected when they went on strike, picketed, 
handed out pamphlets, or engaged in many other protected activities in 
public. The employees or third parties could, if they chose to do so, spread 
word of the event well beyond the walls of the workplace. 
Public social media posts, especially those not directed at co-workers 
are different from these other means of expression. 
B. To Protect the Employer’s Business Interests while Allowing 
Employees to Exercise their Section 7 Rights, the NLRB Should 
Consider the Form of Employee Protests 
When applying section 7 to activity on the Internet, courts should adopt 
a test that would protect the rights of employees to discuss problems that 
arise in the workplace while allowing the employer to respond to those 
problems and control its public image, when possible.
225
 The NLRB has 
broad discretion under the NLRA to make sure the law effectuates its 
purpose in new scenarios. In Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, the Supreme Court 
refused to ―delineate precisely the boundaries of the ‗mutual aid or 
protection‘ clause,‖ reasoning that the task should be one ―for the Board to 
 
 
 223. See generally Stacy Katz Carchman, Cyberbullying: A Growing Threat Among Students, SUN 
SENTINEL, Feb. 11, 2009, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2009-02-11/news/0902100110_1_cyber 
bullying-school-students-cell-phones. 
 224. Michelle Singletary, Can Complaining About Your Job on Facebook Get You Fired?, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 15, 2011, at A14 (employee who was the subject of discharged co-workers‘ public 
Facebook discussion said the conversation was ―cyber-bullying‖ and ―harassing behavior‖). 
 225. Other commentators have suggested that employers could more carefully craft their social 
media policies to address the issue. See Carson Strege-Flora, Wait! Don’t Fire That Blogger! What 
Limits Does Labor Law Impose on Employer Regulation of Employee Blogs?, 2 SHIDLER J. L. COM. & 
TECH. 11, 14 (2005). However, policies that have a ―chilling effect‖ on employee speech may be 
readily struck down as violating the NLRA. Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824, 825 (1998) 
(―mere maintenance‖ of a policy that tends to chill employees‘ exercise of their right to engage in 
concerted activity violates the NLRA). For a discussion of possible legislative amendment to limit 
employee rights to conduct certain activities on the Internet, see Bielan, supra note 39, at 157. 
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perform in the first instance as it considers the wide variety of cases that 
come before it.‖226 In that case, the Court suggested that, ―even when 
concerted activity comes within the scope of the ‗mutual aid or protection‘ 
clause, the forms such activity permissibly may take may well depend on 
the object of the activity.‖227 In this excerpt, the Court suggested that the 
Board could use its substantial discretion to find that the purpose of the 
Act would be best effectuated in certain circumstances by considering the 
form of the concerted activity. In the social networking cases, such a test 
would balance the employer‘s interest in putting forth a positive online 
image with the employee‘s right to engage in concerted activity to make 
changes in the workplace. 
This language from Eastex has been cited in only one other opinion: 
Pacemaker Yacht Co. v. NLRB.
228
 In that case, employees were discharged 
for instigating a strike to protest the failure of a company welfare fund to 
pay claims to employee beneficiaries.
229
 The Third Circuit resolved the 
dispute without deciding whether the company violated section 7. In 
concurrence, Judge Garth repeated the well-established rule that 
―employee activities aimed at improving terms and conditions of 
employment can lose their Section 7 protection if carried out in a 
disruptive or otherwise inappropriate manner.‖230 Then, he generalized the 
trend of circumstances that leads to an employee losing protection. ―[T]he 
general rule adopted by the courts has been to look at a variety of factors, 
including the reasonableness of the means of protest, in order to determine 
if the employees‘ activities were protected.‖231 Judge Garth articulated a 
rule that would deny employees protected status ―when the actions of 
employees unnecessarily and unfairly inflict economic harm on an 
employer who is neither responsible for the complained-of condition nor 
has any power to correct it.‖232  
This rationale would be particularly applicable to the social networking 
cases and lead to fairer results. Employee activity on a social network can 
have unfortunate effects because the material could go viral or be 
 
 
 226. 437 U.S. 556, 568 (1978). 
 227. Id. at 568 n.18 (emphasis added). This reasoning was consistent with Professor Getman‘s 
suggestion that employees‘ concerted activity that imposes ―economic pressure‖ on the employer 
―should be unprotected.‖ Julius G. Getman, The Protection of Economic Pressure by Section 7 of the 
National Labor Relations Act, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1195, 1221 (1967). 
 228. 663 F.2d 455, 463 (3d Cir. 1981) (Garth, J., concurring). 
 229. Id. at 456. 
 230. Id. at 461. 
 231. Id. at 462 (quoting Abilities & Goodwill, Inc. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1979)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 232. Id. 
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broadcast to customers that the employee connects with online. At some 
expense to the employer‘s public image, the opportunity for unfettered 
online social networking activity only marginally furthers the cause of 
employees.
233
 Using discretion under section 7 to scrutinize the form of 
the concerted activity in relation to its purpose would reward good 
behavior among employees who bring problems directly to supervisors, 
while allowing them to continue taking stronger measures when 
necessary.
234
 Such a standard would neither ―nullify the right to engage in 
concerted activities‖ nor ―frustrate the policy of the Act to protect the right 
of workers to act together to better their working conditions.‖235 It would 
continue to allow employees to use technology, such as private e-mail 
messages or social network communications,
236
 to organize concerted 
activity.
237
 
Such a test also would not be inconsistent with precedents, which 
already regulate the form of employee-concerted activity by withdrawing 
protection in a number of circumstances. Section 7 protection is denied if 
employees are violent,
238
 unlawful,
239
 in breach of contract, or disloyal.
240
 
Courts have recognized the importance of the employer‘s public image in 
the context of Title VII discrimination
241
 and other provisions of section 
 
 
 233. ―[E]mployers can only hope the NLRB will find a common sense balance between the 
employee‘s right to concerted activity under the NLRA, and the employer‘s right to keep workplace 
issues reasonably private and out of the public eye.‖ Evans, supra note 137. 
 234. For example, in B & P Motor Express Inc. v. NLRB, the employees first discussed their 
various complaints against the employer, then brought their concerns to their office manager. 413 F.2d 
1021, 1022 (7th Cir. 1969). When the situation went unresolved, they went a step further and spoke 
with the terminal manager. Id. at 1023. Finally, still unsatisfied at their company‘s unresponsiveness, 
they walked off the job. Id. The court held that their activities were protected under section 7. Id. 
 235. NLRB. v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962). 
 236. See, e.g., Guard Publ‘g Co. v. NLRB, 571 F.3d 53, 59–61 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Timekeeping 
Sys., Inc., 323 NLRB 244 (1997); see also Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 
2002) (protecting under the Railway Labor Act statements that an employee made on a secure 
website); Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003) (protecting from tort liability an employee 
who sent to his co-workers e-mails that were critical of his employer). 
 237. Critics may allege that limitations on the form of concerted activity would simply be 
―judicial hostility toward employees using alternative methods of bringing about change in the 
workplace.‖ Bill Hylen, NLRB v. Motorola: A Narrow Interpretation of the “Mutual Aid or 
Protection” Clause of the National Labor Relations Act, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 253, 253 (1994). 
 238. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 255 (1939). 
 239. Hagopian & Sons, Inc. v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 947, 952 (6th Cir. 1968). 
 240. Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 822, 830 (1st Cir. 1981). 
 241. Brown v. F.L. Roberts & Co., 419 F. Supp. 2d 7, 16 (D. Mass. 2006) (employer would suffer 
undue hardship through damage to its ―desired public image‖ if it were required to allow an employee 
to have contact with customers, where that employee did not shave or cut hair because of Rastafarian 
beliefs); see also Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 136 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing cases 
supporting the proposition that ―[c]ourts considering Title VII religious discrimination claims have 
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7.
242
 Additionally, in the context of section 7 as it applies to hospitals, 
courts apply special rules that limit the form of the employee-protests by 
not protecting conversations that occur around patients.
243
 
Given these precedents and the special problems that concerted activity 
can create on the Internet, courts should not extend section 7 protection to 
employees who, instead of preparing for some constructive activity at 
work, choose at the outset a form of concerted activity that is harmful to 
their employer‘s public image. Particularly when these employees show 
little interest in taking further concerted activity to change a term or 
condition of employment, the protection does not seem to further the 
purpose of the NLRA. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The NLRB in Timekeeping Systems noted that ―unpleasantries uttered 
in the course of otherwise protected concerted activity do not strip away 
the Act's protection.‖244 In that case, however, the ―unpleasantries‖ were 
sent through a private email to other employees—not over a medium that 
intrinsically would broadcast the information to the outside world.
245
 The 
Board is tasked with the ―responsibility to adapt the Act to changing 
patterns of industrial life,‖246 and as the social network cases increase in 
number, courts should take special care to make sure the litigants meet the 
burdens of precedent. Case law has placed important elements into the 
definition of concerted, protected activity, and those requirements will 
ensure that the statute does not protect new forms of online discussion that 
would not be protected if they occurred in similar ―offline‖ mediums. 
Employer policies and practices that result in the termination of employees 
who take their grievances to the Internet do not hinder the employees‘ 
ability to constructively communicate or engage in concerted activity. 
 
 
also upheld dress code policies that . . . are designed to appeal to customer preference or to promote a 
professional public image‖). 
 242. For example, an employee has a right under section 7 to wear union insignia. Republic 
Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 795–804 (1945). However, this right may ―be curtailed if the 
employer makes an affirmative showing that the union insignia that the employee seeks to wear will 
negatively impact a certain public image that the employer seeks to project.‖ Meijer, Inc. v. NLRB, 
130 F.3d 1209, 1217 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 243. ―These rules require striking a balance between the employees‘ statutory rights and the needs 
of the health care employer to provide undisrupted patient care in a tranquil atmosphere. Thus, the 
Board has held that health care facilities may prohibit solicitation in immediate patient care areas.‖ 
Aroostook Cnty. Reg‘l Ophthalmology Ctr., 317 N.L.R.B. 218, 218 (1995). 
 244. Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244, 249 (1997).  
 245. Id. at 246. 
 246. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975). 
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Rather, they restrict discussions to non-public forums that are equally 
accessible and more constructive for people who want to change the terms 
and conditions of their job. 
The NLRB has ―substantial responsibility to determine the scope of 
protection in order to promote the purposes of the NLRA,‖247 but now that 
the agency is logged on to cyberspace, it is sanctioning activities that 
arguably fall outside what precedent protects. If the law will ―protect an 
employee from discipline or discharge related to any social media 
conduct,‖ it will go far beyond what the NLRA should accomplish.248 The 
social network cases give the agency an opportunity to adopt a framework 
that will allow employees and employers to use the Internet in ways that 
will help make the workplace better for everyone. 
Andrew Metcalf
 
 
 247. Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
 248. Shilling, supra note 26. 
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